Consider a differentiated Bertrand model with demands for firms 1 and 2 given, re- spectively, by:
x_(1)=10-p_(1)+p_(2)
x_(2)=10-p_(2)+p_(1)
(a) The costs of each firm are given by
c_(1)=c_(2)=3
. Plot the best responses. Solve for the equilibrium prices and profits for each firm. (b) Suppose now that firm 1 succeeds in increasing 2's cost from
c_(2)=3
to
c_(2)=6
, and this is costless for firm 1. Compute the new equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits, and draw the change in the best responses. (c) Assume that firm 1 can raise firm 2's marginal cost as in part (b) but that this action is costly - that is, firm 1 faces an increase of its marginal cost
c_(1)
when attempting to raise its rival's cost. How high can
c_(1)
rise before it becomes un- profitable for firm 1 to raise its rival's cost to
c_(2)=6
?