(Solved): kindly do all parts , do handwritten , i will upvote you  (a) Consider a 2-player zero-sum ga ...

kindly do all parts , do handwritten , i will upvote you 

(a) Consider a 2-player zero-sum game with the following payoff matrix. The matrix given, as usual, from the perspective of the row player. CI 0? C CA TI 1 2 1 3 72-1 0-2 0 Fy 1 3 1 4 14-20 -1 0 (i) Give the security levels associated with each of the strategies for both players and list all pure Nash equilibria for the game. If there are no pure Nash equlibria for the game, explain how you determined this. (ii) Consider a mixed strategy (x, y) in which x¹ = (1/2,0,1/2,0) and yT= = (1/3,0,2/3,0). Compute the security levels associated with x and y. Show your work. (iii) Is (x, y) a Nash equilibrium? Justify your answer.