Mendelssohn therefore supported the movement for 'popular philosophy' which sought ot spread Enlightenment ideas among lower social classes(Outram, 2005, p.1). Enlightenment is also, in a much quoted phrase, 'man's release from his self-incurred immaturity. through the use of reason, and without guidance from others(Outram, 2005, p.1). As Kant remarked, reflecting this ambiguity: "The public use of man's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about Enlightenment among men; the private use of reason may be quite often seriously restricted'(Outram, 2005, p.2). Kant makes clear his irritation with those who saw Enlightenment as an uncomplicated progress towards the achievement of rational social and political change(Outram, 2005, p.2). For Kant it was clear that Enlightenment was a process, not a completed project, and one at that full of ambiguities, danger, problems and completed traditions(Outram, 2005, p.2). This version ofEnlightenment saw it as a desire for human affairs to be guided® by rationality, rather than faith, superstition or revelation, a world view based on science, and not tradition(Outram, 2005, p.3). Gay defines the programme of the Enlightenment as one of hostility to religion, and as the search for freedom and progress, achieved by a critical use of reason to change man's relationship with him self and society(Outram, 2005, p.3). The Enlightenment had always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant. The program of the Enlightenment was the disenchantment of the world: the dissociation of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy(Outram, 2005, p.6). The Enlightenment, he argued, contained the potential for emancipating individuals from restrictive particularism in order to be able to act, not as 'Germans’ embattled by adherence to a particular national and cultural ethos, but rather as human beings engaged in a common search with other human beings for universal values such as freedom, justice and objectivity(Outram, 2005, p.6).Locke’s views is that the transition from the state of nature to cicil society entails the relinquishing or curtailment of certain individual rights or liberties(Lowe, 2005, p.171) He thinks that reason, embodied in the laws of nature, instructs all men, even in the state of nature, that their individual interests are best served by establishing peace- which Locke believes can be achieved only if each gives up his natural right to everything on condition that all the rest do likewise(Lowe, 2005, pp.171-172). For Locke is emphatic that consent is indeed a necessary condition of any individual’s political obligation-children, of course, being excluded from consideration on account of their youth and supposedly immature powers of reason(Lowe, 2005, p.173). According to Locke, alienated or relinquished upon joining civil society, since it is necessary that th rightful ownership of property be subject to the laws of the state(Lowe, 2005, p.174). Express consent to membership of a civil society-though, say, the perpetual obligation to obey its laws(Lowe, 2005, p.174). Even so, we may be inclined to concur with both Hart and Hume in thinking that political obligation typically does not rest so much upon consent, weather express or tacit, as on mutually advantageous co-operative relationships between the members of a community(Lowe, 2005, p.177). Does someone who enjoys more benefits somehow tacitly consent to obey more laws?If not, then is someone who scarcely benefits at all under as far-reaching an obligation as someone who benefits enormously?That scarcely seems fair(Lowe, 2005, pp.177-178). Locke was writing at a time at which only male property-owners of a certain standing should vote in parliamentary elections and he had no obvious wish to challenge that arrangement(Lowe, 2005, p.178).