There are 100 consumers in the suburb Little Italy all of whom buy either one medium pizza or nothing. Each consumer has a reservation price of $15. That is, each consumer is willing to pay at most $15 for a medium pizza. There are two pizza stores - A and B - located next to each other. It costs $7 to make a medium pizza. The price of pizza is in whole dollars (e.g., $8, $7, but not $6.99 or $8.50) Let pa and pb denote the price charged by stores A and B respectively. For simplicity, assume pi in {1, 2, ..., 15} for both i = A, B. If pi < pj , all consumers buy pizza from store i as long as pi <= $15. If pi = pj = p, and p <= 15, then 50 consumers buy from store A while 50 buy from store B. (i) Write down A’s and B’s payoff/profit in terms of pa and pb. Note, we are not asking (iii) Are all equilibria in (ii) admissible? (iv) Suppose store B plays a mixed strategy where it chooses 7, 8, and 9 with equal (probability 1/3). What is the best response for player A?